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Abstract / Résumé
This article assesses whether Aboriginal voter turnout in Ontario can be
increased under a different electoral system. The ways in which the first-
past-the-post electoral system affects voter turnout among Aboriginal
peoples are assessed, including an historical examination of Aboriginal
electoral politics in Canada and corresponding low levels of Aboriginal
voter turnout. Newly-collected, cross-time comparative data are pre-
sented on First Nations voter turnout in Ontario elections. The data are
assessed within the context of Aboriginal alienation and nationalism,
with the purpose of determining the role that each plays in affecting
Aboriginal turnout. Finally, options for improving Aboriginal voter turn-
out are evaluated.
L’article évalue si la participation électorale des Autochtones en Ontario
pourrait être accrue en adoptant un système électoral différent. L’auteur
évalue les incidences du système majoritaire uninominal sur la
participation électorale des Autochtones en procédant, entre autres, à
un examen historique de la politique électorale des Autochtones au
Canada et des faibles niveaux correspondants de participation des
Autochtones. On présente des données comparatives temporelles,
nouvellement recueillies, sur la participation électorale des Autochtones
en Ontario. On évalue les données dans le contexte de l’aliénation et du
nationalisme autochtones en vue de déterminer le rôle de chacun de
ces facteurs dans la participation électorale des Autochtones. L’auteur
évalue aussi les options d’amélioration de la participation électorale
autochtone.
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Introduction
Civic engagement is often considered a fundamental indicator of
political legitimacy in a representative democracy. By extension, voter
turnout levels are deemed to embody civic connectedness or lack thereof.
However, in seeking to understand the roots of civic engagement, in-
cluding voter turnout, the underlying political climate in a democracy is
rarely as straightforward as these statements would suggest. Rather,
nuanced complexity is the norm. The legitimacy of a democracy and its
electoral system cannot be based solely on the extent of voter turnout
at periodic elections.
There has been extensive academic debate and ardent advocacy in
favour of electoral reform by various organisations, including Fair Vote
Canada and its Ontario and Alberta provincial counterparts, Fair Voting
BC, the Mouvement pour une Démocratie Nouvelle in Quebec, among
others. The debate over electoral reform stems largely from concerns
over a “democratic deficit” in Canada. In particular, these concerns are
fuelled by ever-dropping voter turnout rates,1 rooted in what appears to
be overall political disengagement by the Canadian electorate.  High
cynicism and low confidence prevail among Canadian attitudes toward
politicians and political institutions.2
How can worsening Canadian political disaffection be remedied?
More specifically, how can electoral participation be improved? Does
the deterioration of civic engagement necessitate electoral reform? There
are several theories on improving voter turnout, based largely on politi-
cal participation data. A full discussion is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle. However, the most pertinent insights for improving voter turnout, at
least for the purposes of this article, are institutional in nature. Aside
from compulsory voting, which tends to result in higher turnout,3 many
contend that electoral reform can increase overall voter turnout.4 Spe-
cifically, it is suggested that where electoral systems have higher levels
of proportionality between the parties’ shares of the popular vote and
the number of corresponding party seats in the legislative body—as
occurs in Proportional Representation (PR) or mixed systems—higher
levels of voter turnout are more likely. Consequently, in countries where
plurality-majority electoral systems are in place, reforms to include pro-
portionality are likely to improve overall voter turnout, even if only slightly.5
The First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) system, also known as the single-
member plurality system, is currently in place across Canada. Would
electoral reform, including some degree of proportionality, improve voter
turnout in Canada? In recent years, various jurisdictions in Canada have
looked at this issue, fuelled in part by concerns over decreasing voter
turnout. In April 2003, the government of British Columbia created the
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Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform, with the purpose of assessing
the electoral system in British Columbia, including the possibility of re-
form. In October 2004, the final report of the Citizens’ Assembly pro-
posed that the FPTP electoral system should be changed to a Single
Transferable Vote (STV) system, customised to British Columbia as “BC-
STV.” On 17 May 2005, the British Columbia electorate voted in a refer-
endum on the proposed electoral reform, but the proposal failed.6   In
November 2005, Prince Edward Island held a plebiscite on whether the
province’s electoral system should be changed to a mixed-member pro-
portional (MMP) system, but the proposal failed.7
Similarly, in March 2006, the Ontario government established the
Ontario Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform, which undertook to
determine whether a change to Ontario’s FPTP electoral system was
needed. Between April and June 2006, 103 registered voters were ran-
domly selected, one from each of Ontario’s former electoral districts,8 to
serve on the Citizens’ Assembly. Including the Chair, George Thomson,
fifty-two members of the Assembly were women and fifty-two members
were men.  At least one member was an Aboriginal person. The Assem-
bly’s final recommendation was included in a report released on 15 May
2007.  Electoral reform to Ontario’s FPTP electoral system was suggested
in the form of a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system, which is a
combination of FPTP and PR systems. The proposed system would al-
low each voter to choose both a local member, as has been the case
under FPTP, as well as a preferred political party. The Legislative As-
sembly of Ontario would have 129 seats, wherein the number of elec-
toral districts would be reduced to ninety with the remaining thirty-nine
seats filled by party list members. Where a political party receives at
least three percent of the votes, and if that party is entitled to a greater
number of seats than won locally, list members would be added in order
to achieve approximate proportionality. Before elections, parties would
be required to publicly nominate candidates for their list members, in-
cluding a description of how these members were chosen. Overall, the
party with the largest number of seats won would be asked to form the
government, likely resulting in recurrent minority governments.9 All
Ontarians had the opportunity to vote on the suggested changes in a
referendum held concurrently with the Ontario provincial election on 10
October 2007. Prior to that time, the Ontario government determined
that the recommended MMP electoral system would have only come
into effect if a super-majority threshold of 60 percent of valid votes prov-
ince-wide, plus a simple majority of at least 50 percent in sixty-four of
Ontario’s provincial ridings, were achieved.10 However, voter support for
the proposed changes fell far short of the required minimum support
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levels, with only 36.9 percent in favour of the proposed reforms and five
ridings with more than 50 percent support.11 A discussion of the reasons
behind these results is beyond the scope of this paper. Yet, the most
apparent reasons for the failed attempts at electoral reform in Ontario
included low voter turnout and an overall lack of voter awareness due to
poor media coverage and the absence of a clear, well-funded, educa-
tional campaign by the Ontario government and Elections Ontario.
While voter turnout has been declining overall, there are also certain
groups whose voting levels are even lower than that of the general popu-
lation. Notable in this regard are ethnic minorities, youth, and Aboriginal
peoples.12 This paper focuses on the latter group—specifically First Na-
tions—in the context of Canada, and more particularly, in the Ontario
context; this is especially timely given the recent mandate of the Ontario
Citizens’ Assembly and 2007 Ontario election and referendum. While
there are analogous underlying factors that explain lower levels of voter
turnout among various cohorts, voter turnout among First Nations is a
unique phenomenon with distinctive underlying factors. Given this dis-
tinctiveness, and in light of the recent debate in Ontario over electoral
reform, this paper asks the following principal question:  Is it possible to
increase First Nations voter turnout through the implementation of a
different electoral system, or are there other substantive issues at play?
This paper asserts two related issues in tandem. First, it is contended
that numerically increasing First Nations voter turnout is a multifaceted
task, requiring a different approach than simply altering the type of elec-
toral system in Ontario. Second, this paper argues that the issue of low
First Nations voter turnout across Canada and in Ontario provincial elec-
tions is not simply a matter of voter apathy or alienation, as is often the
case among groups with low voter turnout.
In focusing on these themes, this paper reviews the ways in which
the FPTP electoral system—in Ontario, and more generally, in Canada—
affects voter turnout among First Nations. This includes an historical
examination of Aboriginal electoral politics in Canada and low levels of
First Nations voter turnout. Following this, cross-time comparative data
are presented on First Nations voter turnout in Ontario in recent federal
and provincial elections. These data deal specifically with voter turnout
among First Nations in Ontario, with the purpose of gaining greater in-
sight into recent and current trends in First Nations voting in the prov-
ince vis-à-vis the general population. Further comparisons are drawn
with First Nations voter turnout in Ontario First Nation Council elections,
held under the Indian Act.13 At this point, data have only been collected
for First Nations communities in Ontario, simply because voter turnout
data are not available for specific Métis communities, off-Reserve com-
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munities, or the urban Aboriginal population in the province.14 Neverthe-
less, the volume of data collected on First Nations voter turnout is ex-
pansive and provides a clear, reliable picture of how a large portion of
the First Nations population engages in Ontario electoral politics. The
data are assessed within the context of First Nations alienation and na-
tionalism, with an eye to determining the role that each plays in affecting
First Nations voter turnout. The specific methodological issues surround-
ing these data are discussed later in the paper.
First Nations Voter Turnout in Canada: Historical Denial
and Political Consequences
First Nations and Historically-Restricted Electoral Participation
From Confederation onwards, “registered Indians” under the Indian
Act were only permitted to vote in federal elections “if they gave up their
treaty rights and Indian status through a process defined in the Indian
Act and known as ‘enfranchisement’.”15 In order to vote in federal elec-
tions, “registered Indians” were also expected to surrender their distinct
identities, “integrate” into the dominant society, and give up the right to
property tax exemption.16 Overall, the entire process was a comprehen-
sive tool of assimilation, and to this day casts a negative shadow on
electoral participation for many First Nations.17 Various arguments were
advanced in parliamentary debates in order to support the denial of the
franchise to First Nations. In particular, four central contentions stand
out, not only because of the frequency with which they were used, but
also because they are singularly and explicitly unjust. First, it was con-
tended that First Nations socio-economic conditions were too poor, and
consequently, “Aboriginal people were not ‘civilized’ or ‘literate,’ that
they were ‘wards’ of the government and susceptible to voter manipula-
tion by the government in power and thus not worthy of the right to
vote.”18 Second, precisely because of the distinct status of First Nations
under the Indian Act, some asserted that the right to vote could not
reasonably be extended to “registered Indians.” For instance, treaty pay-
ments and annuities, prohibitions on entering into contracts, buying, or
selling, as well as exemption from taxation were considered “special”
factors which justified the withholding of fundamental citizenship rights.19
Third, early on, the franchise was considered as an incident of propri-
etary ownership. Since First Nations Reserve lands are designated as
federal lands, some contended that the distinct First Nations land ten-
ure system on Reserves was at odds with the franchise at the time.20
Finally, those who sought to deny voting rights to First Nations over the
course of parliamentary debates used the distinct political conscious-
ness of First Nations to their advantage. In particular, opponents of First
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Nations voting rights argued that First Nations assertions of sovereignty
were “inconsistent with any [First Nations] participation in Parliament.”21
It was not until 1960, under the government of Prime Minister
Diefenbaker, that the Canada Elections Act22 granted all “registered In-
dians” the right to vote. The Inuit were able to vote in federal elections
held after 1950,23  but federal ballot boxes were not available in all Inuit
hamlets until 1962. Historically, non-status First Nations and Métis peo-
ples have not formally been restricted from voting, but this is primarily
because they have been considered outside of the ambit of federal gov-
ernment responsibility.24
First Nations political representation shares an important associa-
tion with First Nations voting behaviour. The restrictions placed on the
right of First Nations to vote have resulted in an overall lack of First
Nations political representation in Canadian governments.25 This trend
continues to the present, with very few First Nations, Inuit, or Métis indi-
viduals ever having served in Parliament or provincial legislatures. For
example, there have been only twenty-six self-identified First Nations,
Inuit, or Métis persons who have been elected to the House of Com-
mons.26 As a result, the Canadian electoral system arguably suffers from
a lack of legitimacy from the perspective of many First Nations. A de-
tailed listing of those First Nations, Inuit, and Métis individuals who have
served as Members of Parliament is provided in Table 1.
Low Voter Turnout Among First Nations Peoples in Canada:
Causes and Consequences
In light of the historical restrictions placed on First Nations voting,
the development of First Nations political participation in Canadian poli-
tics has not occurred in tandem with that of non-First Nations groups.
Instead, political involvement of First Nations in Canadian electoral poli-
tics has been restricted and encumbered by historical government poli-
cies.27 While this might be considered reasonable, given that newly-en-
franchised groups frequently require several decades to exercise their
right to vote at rates comparable to the general population,28 the trend
of low voter turnout among First Nations is also a contemporary phe-
nomenon, having lasted for approximately fifty years.
More generally, voter turnout tends to be lower among certain groups.
Voter turnout is most commonly affected by socio-economic, psycho-
logical, and political factors. Socio-economic factors such as age, edu-
cation, income, and employment status play important roles. More of-
ten, those who are younger, with lower levels of education and income,
and who are unemployed, are less likely to vote. Psychological factors
are also significant determinants of voter turnout, particularly level of
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interest in politics, knowledge or information about politics, alongside
feelings of political efficacy. Those who have less interest in politics,
have less knowledge about political issues, or feel that their votes will
have little impact, are less likely to vote. Finally, there are important po-
litical factors at play in influencing voter turnout, including party identi-
fication and overall degree of political cynicism. Those who are not affili-
ated with a political party or who do not identify with any political ideol-
ogy are less likely to vote, as are people who are more cynical toward
the political system and politics.29
Alienation is at once a common cause and consequence at the core
of many of these elements. For instance, those who feel alienated from
the political system and electoral politics are often less interested in
politics, and consequently, may have less knowledge about political af-
fairs. This, in turn, contributes to feelings of political inefficacy and wors-
ened alienation. Additionally, those who feel alienated from the political
system are less likely to have any sort of party affiliation and are more
likely to convey pessimism towards or distrust of the political system.
Groups who feel alienated from Canadian politics come from a wide
spectrum of cohorts, including youth, minority cultures, immigrant
groups, and First Nations.30
It is argued here that First Nations are significantly alienated from
the Canadian political system, largely because of historical restrictions
on voting and electoral participation. However, the case of First Nations
voter turnout is more complex, with several nuanced aspects underly-
ing First Nations voter turnout levels.31 Not only has First Nations en-
franchisement occurred relatively recently, but, as noted above, enfran-
chisement itself was used previously as a tool of assimilation. As a re-
sult, this particular factor is both historical and political in nature. It con-
stitutes one of the central underlying features of low levels of First Na-
tions voter turnout in Canadian elections. This is primarily because it
embodies “a sense of alienation from the electoral system and political
processes, feelings of exclusion, …a perceived lack of effectiveness,
the non-affirmation of group difference by and within electoral politics,
and the virtual lack of a group’s presence or representation in electoral
politics (and in politics generally).”32 All of this is intensified by the fact
that First Nations peoples “see themselves as distinct from other Cana-
dians and as belonging to ‘nations within,’ [but] as nations that are not
represented ‘within.’”33
In addition to this distinct contributing factor, First Nations voter
turnout is also affected by overall age and socio-demographic charac-
teristics. The First Nations population is younger than the general popu-
lation in Canada, while a disproportionate number of First Nations live in
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 First Name Electoral District(s) Political
 Elected Affiliation
 2006 Rod Bruinooge Winnipeg South, Manitoba Conservative
 2006 Tina Keeper Churchill, Manitoba Liberal
 2006 Gary Merasty Desnethé—Missinippi—Churchill Liberal
River, Saskatchewan
 2005 Todd Norman Russell Labrador, Newfoundland and Liberal
Labrador
 2004 Bernard Cleary Louis-Saint-Laurent, Quebec Bloc Québécois
 2004 David Smith Pontiac, Quebec Liberal
 1997 Nancy Karetak-Lindell Nunavut, Northwest Territories;
Nunuvut, Nunavut Liberal
 1997 Rick Laliberte Churchill River, Saskatchewan NDP; Liberal
 1996 Lawrence O’Brien Labrador, Newfoundland and Liberal
Labrador
 1993 Paul Devillers Simcoe North, Ontario Liberal
 1993 Elijah Harper Churchill, Manitoba Liberal
 1988 Jack Iyerak Anawak Nunatsiaq, Northwest Territories Liberal
 1988 Ethel Dorothy Blondin- Western Arctic, Northwest Liberal
Andrew Territories
 1988 Wilton Littlechild Wetaskiwin, Alberta PC
 1984 Thomas Suluk Nunatsiaq, Northwest Territories PC
 1983 Gerry St. Germain Mission—Port Moody, British PC
Columbia
 1980 Cyril Keeper Winnipeg—St. James, Manitoba; NDP
Winnipeg North Centre, Manitoba
 1979 Peter Ittinuar Nunatsiaq, Northwest Territories NDP
 1972 Walter Firth Northwest Territories, Northwest NDP
Territories
 1968 Leonard Stephen Kamloops—Cariboo, British Liberal
Marchland Columbia
 1963 Eugène Rhéaume Northwest Territories, Northwest PC
Territories
 1948 William Albert Boucher Rosthern, Saskatchewan Liberal
 1930 Errick French Willis Souris, Manitoba PC
 1873 Louis Riel Provencher, Manitoba Independent
 1871 Pierre Delorme Provencher, Manitoba Conservative
 1871 Angus McKay Marquette, Manitoba Conservative
 Source: Parliament of Canada at http://www.parl.gc.ca/ .
Table 1
Self-Identified First Nations, Inuit, and Métis Candidates Elected
to the House of Commons, 1867-2006
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Political Aboriginal Years
Affiliation Heritage Re-elected
Winnipeg South, Manitoba Conservative Métis None
Liberal First Nations None
Desnethé—Missinippi—Churchill Liberal First Nations None
, Newfoundland and Liberal Métis 2006
ent, Quebec Bloc Québécois First Nations None
Liberal Métis None
erritories;
Liberal Inuit 2000; 2004; 2006
, Saskatchewan NDP; Liberal Métis 2000
, Newfoundland and Liberal Métis 1997; 2000; 2004
Liberal Métis 1997; 2000; 2004
Liberal First Nations None
erritories Liberal Inuit 1993
ctic, Northwest Liberal First Nations 1993; 1997; 2000; 2004
PC First Nations None
erritories PC Inuit None
, British PC Métis 1984
Winnipeg—St. James, Manitoba; NDP Métis 1984
e, Manitoba
erritories NDP Inuit 1980
erritories, Northwest NDP Métis 1974
Kamloops—Cariboo, British Liberal First Nations 1972; 1974
erritories, Northwest PC Métis None
Liberal Métis 1949
PC First Nations None
Independent Métis 1874; 1874
Conservative Métis None
Conservative Métis None
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* In 2004, the names of these ridings were changed, in the same order as they
appear above, to Desnethé—Missinippi—Churchill River, Kenora, Skeena—
Bulkley Valley, Fort McMurray—Athabasca, Abitibi–Baie-James–Nunavik–Eeyou,
Table 2
Canadian Federal Electoral Districts with Minimum Ten Percent
First Nations or Inuit Electors (2001 Census Data)
 Electoral District Province/Territory             Aboriginal
                                          Electors (%)
 Nunavut Nunavut 79
 Churchill Manitoba 55
 Churchill River* Saskatchewan 54
 Western Arctic Northwest Territories 45
 Labrador Newfoundland and Labrador 31
 Kenora—Rainy River* Ontario 25
 Skeena* British Columbia 24
 Yukon Yukon 20
 Athabasca* Alberta 20
 Abitibi—Baie-James— Quebec 20
 Nunavik*
 Dauphin—Swan River* Manitoba 17
 Prince Albert Saskatchewan 16
 Algoma—Manitoulin* Ontario 14
 Selkirk—Interlake Manitoba 14
 Winnipeg North Centre* Manitoba 14
 Regina—Qu’Appelle Saskatchewan 14
 Cariboo—Chilcotin* *British Columbia 14
 Battlefords—Lloydminster Saskatchewan 14
 Winnipeg Centre Manitoba 13
 Saskatoon—Rosetown— Saskatchewan 12
 Biggar
 Lakeland* Alberta 11
 Peace River Alberta 10
 Manicouagan Quebec 10
 Prince George—Bulkley British Columbia 10
 Valley**
 Prince George—Peace British Columbia 10
 River
 Timmins—James Bay Ontario 10
Source: Statistics Canada, Census 2001. There are no ridings with mini-
mum ten percent Métis.
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Dauphin–Swan River–Marquette, Algoma—Manitoulin—Kapuskasing, Winni-
peg—North, Cariboo—Prince George, and Westlock—St. Paul, respectively, as
per parliamentary representation requirements in accordance with the Consti-
tution Act, 1967, 30 & 31 Vic. (U.K.), c. 3 and the Electoral Boundaries Readjust-
ment Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-3. Representation in the House of Commons must
be adjusted after each decennial census (ten years). In each instance, a repre-
sentation order takes effect on the dissolution of Parliament, occurring at least
one year after the representation adjustments are proclaimed.  The names of
these electoral districts were legislatively changed according to An Act respecting
the effective date of the Representation Order of 2003 (R.S.C. 2004, c.1) and An
Act to change the names of certain electoral districts (S.C. 2004, c. 19).
** As per the relevant legislation listed above, this electoral district was ad-
justed to be included in the districts of Prince George—Peace River and Skeena—
Bulkley Valley.
poverty, with high levels of mobility and low levels of education.34 Each
of these components is relevant to both on- and off-Reserve First Na-
tions communities, contributing to feelings of political inefficacy and
exclusion.  In addition, off-Reserve and urban First Nations persons of-
ten suffer from weak social connectedness,35 thereby increasing feel-
ings of alienation.
Each of the above elements is exacerbated further by nearly non-
existent First Nations representation in Canadian political institutions,
alongside an overall lack of recognition of distinctive First Nations po-
litical and cultural practices in Canadian electoral politics.36 First Na-
tions communities are also geographically-dispersed across the coun-
try; there are no electoral districts that consist of First Nations majori-
ties, while very few ridings have “sizeable” First Nations populations.
Table 2 provides a breakdown of Canadian federal electoral districts
with a First Nations or Inuit population of at least ten percent. These
issues are further compounded by poor media communications for many
First Nations and Inuit communities, particularly in the North where me-
dia availability is insufficient and campaign materials are rarely provided
in Aboriginal languages.37 Ultimately, these factors reduce access and
discourage electoral participation.
FPTP and First Nations Political Involvement in Canadian Elections
Table 3a and Table 3b provide overall voter turnout levels for federal
elections in Canada since 1984 and Ontario provincial elections since
1985, with each demonstrating a gradual decline in voter turnout, albeit
a slight anomalous increase in the most recent federal election. As noted
above, significant debate over electoral reform has and continues to
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occur, with many decrying the decline in voter turnout as indicative of a
need for change in Canada’s electoral system. The same is true in On-
tario, where the debate came to a head with the mandate of the Ontario
Citizens’ Assembly.
In the context of First Nations peoples, electoral reform is an impor-
tant issue, precisely because First Nations voter turnout is even lower
than that of the general population. However, there has been very lim-
ited scholarly attention paid to First Nations voter turnout. While there
are a few case studies that examine voter turnout data for First Nations
peoples in certain Canadian provinces,38 most scholarly research on the
 Table 3a
Voter Turnout (%) in Canadian Federal Elections, 1984-2006
Source: Elections Canada at www.elections.ca.
Table 3b
Voter Turnout in Ontario Provincial Elections, 1985-2003
Source: Elections Ontario at www.electionsontario.on.ca.
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larger topic of First Nations electoral participation has dealt almost ex-
clusively with First Nations representation in Canadian legislatures.39 No
previous studies have provided specific data or analysis on First Na-
tions turnout in Ontario.
Nevertheless, a few landmark studies on Aboriginal peoples and elec-
toral reform deserve review. These studies pertain to Aboriginal peo-
ples, more generally, but are obviously relevant specifically to First Na-
tions as well. In particular, a portion of the Royal Commission on Elec-
toral Reform and Party Financing,40 a special Research Volume41 related
to the same Commission, and a report from the Committee for Aborigi-
nal Electoral Reform,42 also published as part of the Commission, stand
out as being thoroughly comprehensive and creative in seeking and rec-
ommending options for improving Aboriginal voter turnout. While the
focus of each is primarily at the federal level, most of what is discussed
applies easily to Ontario. Notably, the primary objective of each report
was to suggest possible mechanisms to enhance Aboriginal voter turn-
out and electoral participation, including improving Aboriginal represen-
tation in Canadian legislatures.
More specifically, each of these reports contends that Aboriginal
voter turnout could be improved through various reforms or adjustments
to the current FPTP electoral system in Canada. By extension, these
suggestions should reasonably apply to the Ontario FPTP electoral sys-
tem as well. Without going into extensive discussion about the recom-
mendations of these reports at this point, it is relevant to note that each
report contends that the current FPTP electoral system limits Aboriginal
participation in Canadian electoral politics.  In particular, the Royal Com-
mission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing emphasises the im-
portance of improving Aboriginal representation in Canadian legislatures,
as a good in itself, but also to indirectly improve Aboriginal voter turnout
in Canadian elections. This is particularly relevant given the dispersed
geographical nature of the Aboriginal population, inadequate media com-
munications, including in Aboriginal languages, and the general socio-
economic trends of many Aboriginal peoples, as discussed earlier in
this paper.43 The rationale behind improving Aboriginal voter turnout,
through increased numbers of Aboriginal representatives, is based on
the idea that Aboriginal peoples may be more likely to participate in
Canadian electoral politics if there are candidates with whom they can
relate, both politically and culturally; these candidates are also consid-
ered potentially more effective in advancing community interests. Fur-
ther, the Royal Commission notes that Aboriginal peoples “find them-
selves disproportionately among those who have been negatively af-
fected by the requirements and regulations of the present voting proc-
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ess, especially given their geographic locations and their languages.”44
Each of these factors contributes to lower Aboriginal voter turnout.
In Aboriginal Peoples and Electoral Reform in Canada, which stems
from the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing,
similar contentions are advanced. While this particular volume deals with
a broad range of topics related to electoral issues and Aboriginal peo-
ples in Canada, and while it does overlap with the Royal Commission in
certain areas, one portion specifically emphasises the inability of the
FPTP electoral system “to provide an effective vehicle of political inter-
action or influence for Aboriginal peoples.”45 The reason behind the in-
effectiveness of FPTP for Aboriginal peoples rests on the fact that the
electoral system does little to promote Aboriginal voter turnout or Abo-
riginal representation in Canadian legislatures.46 Aboriginal voter turn-
out and representation are presented as two sides of the same coin,
with representation ultimately influencing turnout levels. Specifically, the
current FPTP electoral system consists of several barriers that affect
any sort of direct representation of most minority groups in Canada. For
Aboriginal peoples, this problem rests primarily with their geographi-
cally-dispersed nature, thereby minimising the possibility that candidates
might be elected to legislatures. Further, legislatures, including the House
of Commons, do not reflect accurately the composition of the Canadian
population.  Instead, they consist primarily of white males of the middle
class.47 Ultimately, this calls into question the overall legitimacy of the
political system, not only because of explicit limitations on accurate rep-
resentation, but also in the way that the composition of legislative repre-
sentatives affects electoral debate on so-called relevant issues.48 In other
words, when representatives consist primarily of white, middle-class
males, the voices of underrepresented minority groups, including those
of Aboriginal peoples, are more likely to be stifled amidst a plethora of
seemingly-relevant “mainstream” issues.
Together, these issues have an important effect on voter turnout,
which is the other side of the coin. Lack of Aboriginal representation
along with perceived illegitimacy of the electoral system exacerbate feel-
ings of Aboriginal alienation. The result is a significant disconnect from
the Canadian electoral system, and corresponding low voter turnout lev-
els.49 As Roger Gibbins notes, where Aboriginal candidates run in pre-
dominantly-Aboriginal polling areas, Aboriginal turnout rates increase.50
It would seem that Aboriginal candidates help to restore some level of
legitimacy to the FPTP electoral system, but the fact that there are very
few areas where Aboriginal peoples are geographically concentrated
makes this option potentially futile.
One other central report is “The Path to Electoral Equality,” from The
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Committee for Aboriginal Electoral Reform. This report also emphasises
the impact of historical electoral discrimination on Aboriginal peoples
and resultant low levels of Aboriginal voter turnout.51 Additionally, sig-
nificant importance is attached to the negative impact of the FPTP elec-
toral system and corresponding structure of the party system on Abo-
riginal voter turnout. With regard to the latter, it is contended that “[a]s
long as the Aboriginal vote remains diluted and partitioned, political
parties have little incentive to field Aboriginal candidates to win the Abo-
riginal vote.”52 This assertion is also premised on the geographically-
dispersed nature of the Aboriginal population.
With regard to the electoral system, the report contends that elec-
toral laws have not recognised the Aboriginal community of interest.53
This is particularly the case within the confines of the FPTP electoral
system in Canada. While electoral law does allow for the consideration
of various group interests, official language minority groups, and con-
centrated ethnic communities when determining electoral boundaries,
the same cannot be done for Aboriginal peoples, precisely because they
are geographically dispersed.54 However, this is worsened by the fact
that earlier federal electoral boundaries served to dilute the Aboriginal
vote further. As noted by the Committee, this dilution resulted:
from the north-south axis on which the boundaries of north-
ern electoral districts have been drawn, allowing the non-
Aboriginal population in the more populous towns in the
southern parts of a constituency to outvote the Aboriginal
population forming the majority in the rest or most of the
constituency.
…
[T]he application of electoral boundaries legislation has
served to partition the Aboriginal community of interest into
different electoral districts, thereby diluting the Aboriginal
vote and rendering it ineffective.55
Ultimately, this leads to worsened Aboriginal alienation from the Cana-
dian electoral system in conjunction with further degradation of the le-
gitimacy of the system.56 This, in turn, results in lower levels of Aborigi-
nal voter turnout. What can be done to rectify this?  Before assessing
various options, the results of several in-depth statistical analyses on
First Nations voter turnout in Ontario are reviewed.
First Nations Voter Turnout in Ontario: A Case Study
Methodological Considerations
Very few scholarly studies have assessed or collected quantitative
data on First Nations voter turnout in Canada; none have focused spe-
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cifically on Ontario. This is partly because the collection of such data is
a complex task. Quite simply, much of the relevant data simply do not
exist nor can they be obtained easily. For instance, gathering voting
data is nearly impossible for Métis, off-Reserve, or urban Aboriginal
populations because individual demographics are not collected to cor-
respond with individual voting preferences; electoral ballots are confi-
dential. Demographic information, including self-identification with First
Nations communities, is only collected as part of the Canadian Census,
and results from Census data cannot be matched with electors’ voting
choices.
Table 4
Canadian Election Study (CES): Cross-Time Comparison of
Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal Self-Reported Voter Turnout Levels
in Canadian Federal Elections, 1993-2004
The results were obtained by crosstabulating ethnic
origin and voter participation variables, both of
which were present in each survey. The ethnic origin
variable was recoded to identify Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal respondents. The results for the 1993 CES
are statistically significant at .00 with Cramer’s V at
.090. However, 1997 results are not statistically
significant at .139 with Cramer’s V at .038. This
occurs because there are too few cases. The 2000 results are statistically
significant at .00 with Cramer’s V at .072, while the 2004 results are statistically
significant at .00, with Cramer’s V at .086.
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One alternative is to collect data on self-reported voter turnout, but
the proportion of those who respond in the affirmative is often inflated,
since respondents are often motivated to provide socially-desirable re-
sponses that cast themselves in a favourable light.57 This tendency to
over-report voter turnout is seen clearly in Table 4. Data were analysed
from self-reported voter turnout levels in the Canadian Election Study58
for the 1993, 1997, 2000, and 2004 federal elections, and were weighted
nationally to adjust for bias. The results show that Aboriginal voters59
consistently report lower levels of voter turnout than do non-Aboriginal
voters in federal elections.  Notably, self-reported turnout levels among
non-Aboriginal voters are at least 20 percent higher than official voter
turnout for each election.  With regard to First Nations voters, the data
collected for the purposes of this current study, along with the results of
various other studies, demonstrate that First Nations voter turnout is
usually significantly lower than the Aboriginal data reported in Table 4.60
In the few studies that have been conducted on First Nations voter
turnout in Canada, data collection has been limited to poll-by-poll re-
sults on Reserves, thereby focusing solely on results for First Nations
communities. This task is somewhat easier given that, in recent years,
Elections Canada and some provincial Elections offices have attempted
to ensure that some poll boundaries do coincide with First Nations Re-
serve boundaries. For example, a study conducted by David Bedford
and Sidney Pobihushchy,61 is considered the benchmark for research on
First Nations voter turnout in Canada, precisely because it set a prec-
edent for gathering data on First Nations voting.62 Specifically, Sidney
and Pobihushchy gathered First Nations turnout data for federal, pro-
vincial, and First Nation Council elections in Nova Scotia, New Bruns-
wick, and Prince Edward Island between 1962 and 1993. However, in
order to ensure that the data they collected dealt solely with First Na-
tions, they had to limit the collection of data to poll-by-poll results for
polling stations that served First Nations communities alone. Poll-by-
poll results for areas that included both First Nations and non-First Na-
tions electors were excluded, thereby reducing the size of the First Na-
tions sample.63 However, given the rigour with which their methodology
was employed, and since their results were broad-based and “reason-
ably exhaustive,” it can be argued that the results were statistically rep-
resentative of First Nations peoples in the three provinces.64 Of course,
this does not allow for an in-depth understanding of the variations that
exist from one particular First Nations community to another,65 save where
particular voting trends emerge, such as repeatedly low or high voter
turnout for particular communities. In such instances, there may be cul-
tural or geographic factors at play that affect the overall tendency of
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community members to vote.
In this particular case study, the emphasis is placed on First Nations
voter turnout in Ontario. As in the Bedford and Pobihushchy study, data
for First Nations voters living off-Reserve or in urban areas were ex-
cluded because these data are not available. This precludes the inclu-
sion of any data on Métis voters. There are no Inuit hamlets in Ontario,
therefore no data exist for Inuit in the Ontario case. Instead, the empha-
sis is placed on First Nations on-Reserve communities, with poll-by-poll
data obtained for those polling stations that serve exclusively First Na-
tions communities in Ontario. Data were gathered from the official poll-
by-poll results published by Elections Canada and Elections Ontario for
the most recent four federal elections and the two most recent Ontario
provincial elections. By-elections were excluded. Elections Canada and
Elections Ontario provided lists of those polling stations in Ontario that
served exclusively First Nations communities in the 2006 federal and
2003 Ontario provincial election respectively. For the other elections
examined, the relevant polling stations, names, and numbers had to be
matched separately with the original information provided by Elections
Canada and Elections Ontario. In all instances, voter turnout was calcu-
lated from the total amount of votes cast as a percentage of the overall
numbers of eligible voters across all relevant First Nations polling sta-
tions. Where polling stations could not be matched with complete cer-
tainty, they were eliminated in order to maintain the integrity of the data.
Ultimately, while the scope of the data is restricted to on-Reserve First
Nations communities, it is important to note that the data collected are
reliable and significant, given the sheer volume of data collected, cover-
ing a vast number of polling stations across Ontario. Data were excluded
where polling results included both First Nations and non-First Nations
voters. Where polling stations served First Nations communities exclu-
sively, it is reasonable to assert that very few, if any, non-First Nations
persons live in those communities or voted at those particular polling
stations.
First Nations Voter Turnout in Federal and Provincial Elections:
The Ontario Example
The first portion of the data collected focuses on the 1997, 2000,
2004, and 2006 federal elections, with an Ontario regional focus. The
results are presented in Table 5a. In each election, First Nations electors
voted at consistently lower rates than the general population in Ontario,
with a 10- to 20-point range of difference. What is also striking is the fact
that, despite the national decline in voter turnout, First Nations voter
turnout in Ontario in the 2000, 2004, and 2006 federal elections has gradu-
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Table 5a
First Nations Voter Turnout in Ontario, Canadian Federal Elections,
1997-2006
Data on voter turnout for the Ontario general
population were obtained from Elections Canada
at www.elections.ca .
Table 5b
First Nations Voter Turnout in Ontario Provincial Elections,
1999-2003
Data on voter turnout for the Ontario general
poplation were obtained from Elections Ontario at
www.electionsontario.on.ca .
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ally increased.
The same methodology was employed for the 1999 and 2003 On-
tario provincial elections.  Reliable data were not available prior to the
1999 Ontario provincial election.  After conducting extensive research in
order to locate data for any previous Ontario provincial elections, it was
discovered that Elections Ontario has not maintained any databases or
listings on those polling stations that served exclusively First Nations
communities prior to the last provincial election. The results are pre-
sented in Table 5b. Once again, a noticeable difference is present be-
tween voter turnout levels for First Nations and the general population,
albeit to a lesser extent, with a range of eight to twelve percentage points
between the two groups. A drop in voter turnout rates is also noticeable
when comparing the 1999 and 2003 elections. This is quite different from
the results shown in Table 5a, where voter turnout levels for First Na-
tions in Ontario actually increased over time. While data are not avail-
able for First Nations voter turnout in the Ontario provincial elections
prior to 1999, the drop in First Nations voter turnout from 1999 to 2003
may be indicative of an overall trend in First Nations participation in
Ontario provincial elections.
Explaining the Trends: First Nations Voting in Ontario
Interestingly, and as noted above, First Nations voter turnout on
Ontario actually increased in the 2000, 2004, and 2006 federal elections.
The reasons behind this increase are unknown, but it may be that the
efforts of Elections Canada and some Aboriginal organisations, such as
the Assembly of First Nations (AFN), to improve overall Aboriginal voter
turnout have been somewhat successful. Notably, the rate of participa-
tion of the Ontario general population also increased from the 2000 fed-
eral election onwards. This is an interesting dynamic, especially given
the downward trend of voter turnout across the country. Of course, this
national trend has been an overall country-wide average, without taking
into consideration regional deviations.
Conversely, overall Aboriginal electoral participation in provincial
elections is not something that Elections Ontario has attempted to im-
prove in any sort of substantive way, even in recent years. This is in stark
contrast to the significant efforts of Elections Canada over the past sev-
eral years in this regard. While Elections Ontario was able to provide a
list of the relevant polling stations in Ontario that served exclusively First
Nations communities in the 2003 provincial election, the polling station
names and numbers had to be matched separately for the 1999 elec-
tion. This process was not possible for any earlier provincial elections in
Ontario since the polling station names and numbers were substantially
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different prior to 1999. Moreover, very few polling station names prior to
the 1999 Ontario election provided any sort of reference to First Nations
communities or Reserve lands, as they now do.
It is contended here that Elections Canada’s efforts at improving
education and access to voting for Aboriginal peoples have been effec-
tive at the federal level, especially given collaborative endeavours with
national Aboriginal organisations. Alternatively, in the context of Elec-
tions Ontario, Aboriginal voter turnout has largely functioned as a non-
issue, with little attention paid to the special problems faced by Aborigi-
nal electors, arguably doing little to affect First Nations voter turnout
levels over time.66
Previous studies provide important comparisons for the data pre-
sented above. For example, Bedford and Pobihushchy found that First
Nations electors in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward
Island voted at significantly lower rates than the general population, both
in federal and provincial elections. In most instances, the rate of First
Nations voter turnout was between 20 percent and 30 percent lower
than that of the general population. Some instances demonstrated more
drastic differences between First Nations turnout and that of the gen-
eral population, while results for Prince Edward Island were less dis-
similar.67 Moreover, the authors showed that participation rates decreased
significantly between 1963 and 1993 in Nova Scotia and New Bruns-
wick. For instance, First Nations voter turnout in Nova Scotia dropped
from 89.3 percent in 1962 to 54.0 percent in 1988 for federal elections
and from 52.0 percent in 1963 to 45.2 percent in 1993 in provincial elec-
tions.68 In New Brunswick, First Nations voter turnout dropped from 70.0
percent in 1962 to 17.8 percent in 1988 in federal elections and from
64.4 percent in 1967 to 27.6 percent in 1991 in provincial elections.69 A
more moderate decline is evident for Prince Edward Island, where First
Nations participation rates changed from 75.0 percent in 1962 to 72.8
percent in 1988 in federal elections and 80.4 percent in 1976 to 77.7
percent in 1993 in provincial elections.70
While the lower rates of First Nations voter turnout in Nova Scotia,
New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island are comparable to those found
in Ontario vis-à-vis the general populations in each province, an inter-
esting contrast is apparent with regard to voter decline. In particular,
Bedford and Pobihushchy found that First Nations voter turnout dropped
drastically over a three-decade period, but in the data presented herein
on federal elections, First Nations voter turnout in Ontario has actually
increased moderately over the past decade. The precise reasons be-
hind this difference are beyond the scope of this paper, but the different
timeframes, regional differences, and Elections Canada’s efforts may be
268          Jennifer Dalton
relevant factors.
A similar study conducted by Jean-Nicholas Bustros, which focused
on First Nations voter turnout data across the country, provides further
comparison. The methodology was similar, with data based on poll-by-
poll results at the federal level. This study found that First Nations voter
turnout for the 1992 Charlottetown referendum was 41 percent, with 38
percent and 40 percent respectively for the 1993 and 1997 general elec-
tions.71 When compared with voter turnout for the general population—
at 71.8 percent for the referendum, 69.9 percent for the 1993 general
election, and 67.0 percent for the 1997 general election—the differences
between First Nations voter turnout and that of the general population
are striking. While the data presented by Bustros do not deal specifi-
cally with Ontario, there is one notable statistic for comparison, namely
the First Nations voter turnout rate of 40 percent during the 1997 federal
election. This turnout rate was calculated for First Nations electors across
the country and is slightly lower than the voter turnout rate calculated
for First Nations in Ontario during the 1997 federal election, shown above
in Table 5a. These rates are close enough to be comparable, thereby
reinforcing the significance of each.
A third important study, conducted by Daniel Guérin, builds on the
work of Elections Canada’s National and International Research and
Policy Development Directorate. Both use a similar methodology to that
employed in the current study on Ontario. In the Directorate’s study, it
was determined that First Nations voter turnout across the country dur-
ing the 2000 federal election was 47.8 percent.72 In conducting his own
analyses, Guérin found that First Nations turnout across the country
was 48 percent for the 2000 federal election.73 These results are nearly
identical to the Ontario First Nations voter turnout of 47.6 percent in the
2000 federal election, presented in Table 5a. However, Guérin also de-
termined that variations existed across provinces and territories. While
most results for First Nations voters were lower than the national aver-
age, First Nations in a few provinces, namely Saskatchewan and Prince
Edward Island, had higher turnout levels than that of the general popu-
lation.74 Guérin provided no concrete reasons for these differences. He
did suggest that community participation may depend on a socio-cul-
tural factor, wherein elections that deal with issues directly affecting First
Nations communities may garner higher voter turnout from relevant com-
munity members.75
Finally, a recent study completed by Michael Kinnear, which uses a
similar methodology, provides data on First Nations voter turnout in
Manitoba for federal elections between 1962 and 2003. As noted therein,
voter turnout was quite high right after the franchise was extended to
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“registered Indians,” with First Nations turnout at 60.5 percent.76 This
lasted for a few years, but then started to gradually and continually de-
cline, dropping to 6.0 percent in 2003. Most notably, while downward
trends in voter turnout have been found for the general Canadian popu-
lation, the drop in First Nations voter turnout in Manitoba has been ex-
treme.77 These results are quite different from those presented above for
Ontario, but Kinnear provides no explanation for the severe drop in First
Nations voter turnout in Manitoba.
Soaring First Nations Voter Turnout?: Ontario First Nation Council
Elections under the Indian Act
There is one exceptional trend discovered in Ontario, which contra-
dicts all of the data discussed thus far. First Nations Council elections
are administered through Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC)
under the Indian Act. First Nations communities hold these elections to
select Chiefs and band councillors. For the purposes of this study, data
were collected on First Nations voter turnout in Ontario First Nation
Council elections. The Band Governance Directorate of INAC provided
the raw data used to extrapolate the information provided in Table 5c.
The values calculated comprise the average First Nations voter turnout
for all First Nation Council elections held in Ontario in a given year. Most
notable are the significantly-high levels of First Nations voter turnout in
First Nation Council elections between 1998 and 2000, particularly when
compared with First Nations voter turnout in Ontario, both in Canadian
federal elections and in Ontario provincial elections, as presented in Table
5a and Table 5b. Nevertheless, while voter turnout levels are consist-
ently high, this occurs prior to the Supreme Court of Canada ruling in
Corbiere78 in 1999, after which turnout levels drop drastically. In Corbiere,
the Supreme Court held that band members living outside of their Re-
serve communities have the right to vote in First Nation Council elec-
tions. Among other things, this ruling substantially increased the num-
bers of eligible First Nations voters. Ultimately, the decision required the
expansion of eligible voters lists for First Nation Council elections to
include members living outside of the relevant communities. Two data
lines are presented in Table 5c, one indicating the results before Corbiere,
and the other representing the results after Corbiere. There is an overlap
in the yearly values shown because of the 18-month timeframe allowed
to communities for implementation of the ruling, and because different
Ontario bands implemented the relevant requirements at different rates.
Ultimately, the number of eligible voters has expanded several-fold,
but the results of these analyses show that many eligible voters living
outside of their First Nations communities have not voted in First Nation
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Council elections, thereby causing the overall drop in voter turnout lev-
els. This does not, however, indicate that members residing in the com-
munities have voted in fewer numbers. Unfortunately, it is no longer pos-
sible to determine voter turnout levels among only those individuals liv-
ing in the communities. However, the results in Table 5c show that voter
turnout levels have gradually increased despite the initial drop after
Corbiere. The delay in improved voter turnout among those living out-
side of First Nations communities was most likely due to a lack of infor-
mation and confusion about the new voting rights.79
Bedford and Pobihushchy have provided the only other available
data on First Nations voter turnout in band council elections in Canada,
only their study deals with Nova Scotia and New Brunswick between
1961 and 1993.80 They found that participation rates were consistently
high at approximately 90 percent.81 In this instance, First Nations voter
turnout in First Nation Council elections would seem to be even higher
than the pre-Corbiere results presented above.  Overall, these results,
along with the data presented in Table 5c, are striking, particularly given
the usual inattention paid by the general population to municipal poli-
tics, where voter turnout rates of approximately 30 percent are typical.82
Bedford and Pobihushchy have asserted that, in the context of New
Table 5c
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Brunswick and Nova Scotia, high First Nations voter turnout in First
Nation Council elections is due to the amplified significance of Band
governance in the lives of First Nations vis-à-vis the relative importance
of Canadian federal and provincial governance.83
The only other relevant data on First Nations voter turnout within
First Nations communities is based on the 1995 Quebec Referendum.
At the time, several First Nations communities held their own referen-
dums on the issue of Quebec secession from Canada, particularly with
regard to whether Quebec could forcibly include those First Nations
communities living in the province as part of a new sovereign country.
The Grand Council of the Crees asserted that no secession could occur
that would require their inclusion without prior consent. In a separate
referendum held on 24 October 1995, Cree voters were asked the fol-
lowing question: “Do you consent, as a people, that the Government of
Quebec separate the James Bay Crees and Cree traditional territory from
Canada in the event of a Yes vote in the Quebec referendum?” In re-
sponse, 96.3 percent of the Crees voted to stay within Canada, and no-
tably, the turnout was 77 percent, which is much higher than First Na-
tions turnout rates in Canadian elections.84 Similarly, the Inuit of North-
ern Quebec held their own referendum, where they were asked the fol-
lowing question: “Do you agree that Quebec should become sovereign?”
In this instance, 96 percent voted against Quebec sovereignty, with Inuit
voter turnout at 75 percent.85
What do all of these results mean? Why is there such a stark con-
trast between First Nations voter turnout in Canadian and Ontario elec-
tions on the one hand, and in First Nation Council elections on the other
hand? While some might argue that electoral reform would solve the
problem, this paper argues that improving First Nations voter turnout,
including in the Ontario context, involves much more than simply ad-
justing the FPTP electoral system currently in place.
Alienation, Nationalism, or Both?
In light of the new data presented on Ontario, it is abundantly appar-
ent that First Nations voter turnout is significantly and consistently lower
than that of the general population, at least in the context of Canadian
elections. This reinforces the contention that First Nations voters feel
alienated from Canadian electoral politics. Historical, socio-economic,
political, geographic, and communications factors are related to aliena-
tion and feelings of exclusion, ultimately resulting in lower First Nations
voter turnout in provincial and federal elections in Ontario. However,
this does not explain the high levels of First Nations voter turnout in
First Nation Council elections. In fact, the results presented above, along-
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side the previous research of Bedford and Pobihushchy on First Nation
Council elections in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, seem to speak
against assertions of alienation. This issue will be addressed momentar-
ily.
It is argued here that voting patterns among First Nations are the
result of more than just alienation. First Nations nationalism stems from
contested citizenship rooted in historical colonialism and forced assimi-
lation. Many First Nations view their participation in Ontario and Cana-
dian elections as constituting acceptance of colonialism and their his-
torical dependence on the Canadian state. It is this sense of nationalism
that maintains the drive of First Nations to protect their cherished
heritages, cultures, languages, religions, and political practices. For many
First Nations, this may entail the refusal to “give in” to the dominant
electoral culture, including voting in federal and Ontario provincial elec-
tions.
Nationalism and alienation are concomitant components underlying
First Nations voter turnout.  As asserted by Kiera Ladner,
Aboriginal people are not simply a community of interest or
a minority group that feels alienated from the political proc-
ess. They form “nations within”: nations with distinct politi-
cal cultures, political systems, political traditions, histories
of colonization, relationships with other nations (such as
Canada), and visions as to how the relationship between
their nations and Canada should be structured and the man-
ner in which each nation should participate in the affairs of
the other.86
In other words, both alienation and nationalism are crucial factors in
determining levels of First Nations voter turnout. However, this makes
the possibility of improving First Nations voter turnout in Canada more
difficult. While electoral reform may address feelings of alienation, it is
unlikely to influence First Nations nationalism, nor should it.
Others have noted the relevance of First Nations nationalism in af-
fecting First Nations voter turnout. For instance, Bedford and
Pobihushchy have contended that First Nations nationalism is the cen-
tral factor in determining low and declining First Nations voter turnout.87
They have argued that First Nations’ “‘sense of civic duty’ as Canadians
has all but disappeared as they see themselves less and less as Canadi-
ans.”88 Silver et al., who conducted a qualitative study on First Nations
electoral participation in Winnipeg, place similar importance on First
Nations nationalism as an underlying determinant of voter turnout:
A major part of the explanation for the relatively low levels of
participation in the mainstream Canadian political process
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is this nationalism explanation. Many Aboriginal people see
themselves as distinct peoples, as nations.
…
[B]y the early 1980s almost all Aboriginal politics had been
effectively…centred upon the pursuit of Aboriginal rights and
self-government, and the winning of sovereignty for First
Nations.89
These matters are further complicated by the fact that First Nations
voter turnout varies from one community to the next. This point was
alluded to earlier in the paper, but detailed data on specific First Nations
communities’ voter turnout levels could not be provided herein, due to
the sheer volume of data. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to expect that
different First Nations communities will be more or less likely to vote,
depending on a variety of historical, cultural, and political factors that
are specific to each community. By extension, Ladner notes that:
[a]s each Aboriginal collectivity has its own political tradi-
tions and its own vision of a just relationship with Canada,
electoral participation varies substantially, as does the man-
ner in which individuals and collectivities rationalize their
participation (or lack thereof) in Canadian politics. To further
complicate matters, participation rates (and the rationaliza-
tion thereof) vary, especially when comparing nationalists
and traditionally minded individuals who are grounded in their
communities with individuals who have few ties to their na-
tion and its history, political traditions and sense of nation-
alism.90
However, the nationalist explanation does not account for high voter
turnout levels in First Nation Council elections. First Nation Council elec-
tions are also state-imposed electoral institutions, and nationalist senti-
ments, which so obviously affect First Nations participation in Canadian
electoral politics, should arguably also apply in this context, thereby
resulting in lower First Nations voter turnout. This is a puzzling contra-
diction. Bedford and Pobihushchy address this same issue in the con-
text of their research. They contend that voter apathy or alienation can-
not be a factor in First Nations Council elections, quite simply because
of the high level of voter turnout. However, “[t]hese data appear less
anomalous when one understands how critical Band Council decisions
are for persons living in Reserve communities. Welfare, housing, unem-
ployment insurance, jobs, social and health services and education are
very frequently controlled by the Chief and Council. They are responsi-
ble for most of the key services that are delivered.”91
In light of the scope of political power held by chiefs and councils,
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and given the often-poor socio-economic conditions of most First Na-
tions, it is little wonder that First Nations individuals would feel com-
pelled to vote in much higher numbers in First Nation Council elections.
By actively engaging in this elections process, First Nations individuals
are better able to determine the governing structures that so signifi-
cantly affect their lives. As Bedford and Pobihushchy note, “[t]he politi-
cal stakes are simply too high on Reserves to permit the relatively disin-
terested politics that mark Canadian elections.”92 They refer to this com-
plex phenomenon as the “politics of dependency,” which has resulted
from the legacy of colonialism experienced by First Nations peoples.
They describe this aptly in the following quotation:
A political culture and socio-economic reality of dependency
has been created on Reserve communities which expresses
itself in the form of (what would be for municipalities in the
non-Aboriginal culture) abnormally high turnout.... [T]he only
way to explain these striking results is by grounding them in
the unique political, economic and social existence that one
finds in Reserve communities. Local politics has a different
meaning and different consequences for people living in
Reserve communities than in other communities, and this
difference must be central to any explanation of the vast
differences in turnout rates that one finds between local elec-
tions on Reserves and in non-Aboriginal communities.93
These assertions are certainly applicable to First Nations in Ontario.
Ultimately, given the socio-economic conditions faced by First Nations
and in light of the corresponding centrality of band governance in the
lives of First Nations individuals, the data on voter turnout in Ontario
becomes understandable, irrespective of First Nations nationalism.
Yet, these findings and the underlying rationale behind them do not
address the larger issue of low First Nations voter turnout in Ontario,
and more generally, in Canada. There still exists First Nations alienation
from the dominant federal and provincial electoral institutions, while First
Nations nationalism is a fundamental component entering into any dis-
cussions on First Nations political issues. The end result is an electoral
system that lacks legitimacy for First Nations, ultimately leading to fur-
ther alienation. The tenuous relationship between First Nations and the
Canadian state should not be weakened further. Instead, solutions need
to be found that will simultaneously address First Nations alienation,
First Nations nationalism, and the illegitimacy of the current electoral
system in Ontario, and more generally, in Canada.
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The Future of First Nations Voter Turnout:
Possibilities and Solutions
There are many recommendations and possible solutions for im-
proving First Nations voter turnout, all of which cannot be discussed
within the confines of this paper.  Instead, an overview and correspond-
ing analysis will be provided. Some proposed mechanisms are already
in place, including in international jurisdictions, with varying levels of
success.
Increasing General First Nations Representation
Several straightforward, basic mechanisms could be put in place to
potentially increase First Nations voter turnout. In Ontario, these mecha-
nisms would turn on issues of First Nations representation in order to
enhance issue salience and reduce First Nations alienation. For instance,
increasing the number of First Nations Members of Provincial Parlia-
ment at Queen’s Park could help to promote First Nations connectedness
to Canadian and Ontario electoral politics. In order to do so, more op-
portunities for nomination of First Nations candidates in Ontario’s main
political parties would be required, alongside the encouragement of First
Nations involvement in party policy and decision-making.
Of course, it is easy to make these suggestions, but much harder to
put them into practice. The impetus to provide opportunities for First
Nations to become more involved lies with the major political parties in
the province and across the country, and yet, under the current FPTP
electoral system, it seems that there is little desire on the part of political
parties to field First Nations candidates who are considered less “safe.”
Instead, it is commonly argued that proportional representation and semi-
proportional electoral systems are much more effective at providing some
level of representation for disadvantaged or excluded groups, such as
First Nations. However, would this really affect First Nations voter turn-
out? If the Ontario electoral system were changed to one with some
degree of proportionality, would this improve First Nations voter turnout
in the province? It is argued here that changing the model of electoral
system in place would do little to improve First Nations voter turnout
because First Nations nationalism remains a crucial factor in determin-
ing voter turnout levels. Changing the type of electoral system will not
affect First Nations nationalism.
One relevant example is found in the relatively-recent reforms to
New Zealand’s electoral system. After recommendations released by
the Royal Commission on the Electoral System and two subsequent
referendums in 1992 and 1993 on proposed electoral change, the elec-
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toral system was changed from FPTP to a mixed-member proportional
(MMP) system. One of the goals behind this reform was to ensure that
the House of Commons would be more proportionate in its representa-
tion. This was important for the Maori as well, who constitute the Indig-
enous population in the country. Another goal was to improve overall
voter turnout. In the elections following the reforms, increased repre-
sentation for historically-disadvantaged groups, including the Maori, in-
deed occurred, but Maori voter turnout did not increase. In fact, shortly
thereafter, overall voter turnout actually decreased further.94 By exten-
sion, it is argued that changing the FPTP electoral system in Ontario to
a new electoral system, perhaps one that is more proportionate, may
help to improve First Nations representation, but in the long run, it will
not substantially improve First Nations voter turnout because of the ex-
istence of First Nations nationalism. In this way, and as discussed near
the start of this article, theories on electoral reform which contend that
proportionality would improve voter turnout are largely irrelevant in the
context of First nations turnout.
Particularistic Representation and Nation-Based Solutions
Mechanisms that add specific, guaranteed First Nations represen-
tation to existing electoral system may be more effective than general
tools of representation in increasing First Nations voter turnout. These
options do not require fundamental alterations to the electoral system
in place. For instance, guaranteed seats in legislatures, affirmative redis-
tricting, Aboriginal electoral districts (AEDs), and Aboriginal legislatures
have been suggested. However, guaranteed Maori seats in the New Zea-
land parliament have been in existence since the 1860s, and yet, this
has done little to ensure that Maori voter turnout is on a par with that of
the general population. This is primarily because these seats are largely
symbolic.95 While it could be argued that, in Ontario, guaranteed seats
might foster feelings of First Nations connectedness or allow greater
representation of First Nations issues in legislative debates, the New
Zealand example is cause for hesitation. Providing a few token seats in
a Canadian legislature, such as Queen’s Park or Parliament, may be fairly
ineffective, given that the voices of a few First Nations representatives
could be stifled easily by the majority. In this instance, the seats would
have to go beyond mere tokenism and serve as effective vehicles of
First Nations representation.
Affirmative redistricting is somewhat similar, although it does not
entail the creation of any new seats set aside specifically for First Na-
tions representatives. Instead, electoral districts are adjusted to allow
for ridings with more concentrated First Nations populations, thereby
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increasing the possibility that First Nations representatives will be elected.
This may be a difficult task, given the dispersed nature of the First Na-
tions population across Ontario and Canada, but there are some north-
ern electoral districts with much higher concentrations of First Nations.
As in the case of guaranteed seats, affirmative redistricting must be ef-
fective with meaningful results. Otherwise, it is likely that First Nations
would see this option as little more than lip service.
Specific Aboriginal Electoral Districts (AEDs) provide another option
to increase First Nations representation in Canadian legislatures. This
was the central recommendation made by The Committee for Aborigi-
nal Electoral Reform in its report discussed earlier in this paper, and was
subsequently endorsed by the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform
and Party Financing and the related Research Volume on Aboriginal
Peoples and Electoral Reform.96 In particular, AEDs would consist of
electors who identify first and foremost as members of First Nations,
Inuit, or Métis. Regional residence would be a secondary consideration,
with AEDs likely to overlap, or be superimposed upon, geographic dis-
tricts. Specific voters lists would have to be created, the number of dis-
tricts would be debatable, and ultimately, the heterogeneous nature of
First Nations, Inuit, and Métis would have to be considered in construct-
ing the districts.97 It would constitute a large undertaking, and in the
context of Ontario, could be applied irrespective of the electoral system
in place. However, as in the other instances of particularistic represen-
tation, in order effect meaningful change, AEDs could not simply serve
as symbolic seats, where First Nations representatives are given little
voice or credence.
Finally, the creation of Aboriginal parliaments or legislatures has been
suggested. The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) sup-
ported this idea, recommending an Aboriginal Parliament Act to first
establish a representative body of all Aboriginal peoples. This would
then evolve into a House of First Peoples and become part of Canadian
Parliament. The primary role of the Aboriginal Parliament would be an
advisory one to the House of Commons and the Senate on matters re-
lating to Aboriginal peoples, but the RCAP was careful to specify that it
did not want to circumscribe the authority of the proposed Aboriginal
Parliament. Instead, the RCAP provided a fairly extensive list of advi-
sory topics for the Aboriginal Parliament, ultimately allowing for signifi-
cant involvement by Aboriginal peoples. In addition, voters would elect
representatives from their respective nations, and elections would take
place at the same time as federal elections. Enumeration of Aboriginal
voters would also take place during the general enumeration process
held across the country. Ultimately, the RCAP envisioned an Aboriginal
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Parliament that would eventually consist of 60 to 80 representatives,
one from each nation in Canada.98 It is reasonable to contend that a
similar implementation could occur in the context of the Ontario legisla-
ture as well, although it would apply on a smaller scale instead of across
the country.
There was a similar institution in place in Australia until recently.
Various efforts have been undertaken, both historically and more recently
in Australia, to improve Aboriginal voter turnout levels. The National
Aboriginal Consultative Committee, in existence from 1973 to 1977, and
the National Aboriginal Conference, in existence from 1977 to 1985, had
limited advisory roles on matters affecting Aboriginal peoples. From 1990
to 2005, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC)99
was a central governing body that served the interests of Aboriginal
peoples in Australia with some limited executive decision-making pow-
ers.100 It was instituted by the Labor Government of Bob Hawke, but
was dismantled in 2005 by the Liberal government under Prime Minister
John Howard, leaving the future of Indigenous governance in the coun-
try uncertain. Prior to being dismantled, the ATSIC allowed Aboriginal
peoples to be formally involved in government by electing representa-
tives. Representatives were elected separately from Australian Common-
wealth, state, and territory elections. Voting was not compulsory, and
Aboriginal electors did not need to self-identify prior to voting. Near its
conclusion, the ATSIC consisted of 404 elected regional councillors,
covering a total of 35 ATSIC regions grouped under 16 zones.  In each
zone, a national commissioner was also chosen from among the elected
regional councillors.101 Overall, this was a sizeable group representing
the interests of Aboriginal peoples in Australia.
However, the central problem with this model, at least with regard to
increasing Aboriginal voter turnout, is the fact that the Commission had
only limited executive decision-making. In the context of Ontario, such
limits would do little to effectively serve the interests of First Nations
voters. Instead, such a system could be viewed as consisting of par-
tially-imposed electoral politics, with central authority remaining with
the dominant political institutions in power. Similar contentions can be
made regarding the Saami Parliaments in Finland, Norway, and Swe-
den. Each country has a Saami Parliament, which were created in 1973,
1988, and 1992 respectively.  However, the Saami parliaments in Norway
and Finland do not have any legislative functions, so in this way, “parlia-
ment” is a misnomer. Additionally, the Saami were not adequately in-
volved in the creation of any of these institutions.102 The RCAP has as-
serted that a more robust Aboriginal Parliament would be needed, with
the purpose of adequately serving the needs and interests of Aboriginal
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peoples. The RCAP stated that “Aboriginal parliaments can have real
power, and Aboriginal peoples can be fully involved, if not primarily re-
sponsible, for the structure and processes of such institutions.”103 In
this way, it would seem that the RCAP proposal constitutes the most
comprehensive of the mechanisms suggested to improve overall Abo-
riginal electoral participation.
Ultimately, each of the mechanisms discussed above provides
particularistic representation, but where does this leave First Nations
nationalism? It is argued here that First Nations nationalism is an impor-
tant part of any discussion on First Nations politics or Canadian elec-
toral reform. Regardless of any implementation of particularistic First
Nations representation—whether it is through guaranteed seats, affirma-
tive redistricting, AEDs, or an Aboriginal legislature—First Nations na-
tionalism will continue to play a fundamental role in determining First
Nations electoral participation, including voter turnout. More importantly,
it is contended that simply improving First Nations representation with-
out ample First Nations input is not enough to increase First Nations
voter turnout. First Nations will continue to feel that the Canadian and
Ontario electoral systems are foreign impositions, representing coloni-
alism and historical dispossession, thereby lacking legitimacy. Instead,
there needs to be formal and explicit recognition of First Nations as
constituting nations who are culturally different from the rest of Canada,
before any electoral mechanisms can effectively be put in place.104 Re-
gardless of the type of electoral system in Ontario or Canada, recogni-
tion of First Nations nationalism as a viable and vibrant component of
Canadian society and electoral politics is crucial. Official nation-based
recognition would work to bridge the gap of alienation that exists be-
tween First Nations and electoral systems in place, and ultimately, would
help to renew the relationship between First Nations and the Canadian
state. It is asserted that this sort of recognition is the fundamental first
step in improving First Nations voter turnout, both in Ontario and across
the country.
By extension, electoral options that acknowledge and respect First
Nations nationhood would need to be put in place, where First Nations
could participate as distinct nations in the electoral process. Where
particularistic First Nations representation is employed, First Nations
voters would need to be assured of taking part in an electoral process
where they are recognised as members of their distinct nations, and
where they are politically involved to affect their nations. In other words,
the goal would be effective, viable First Nations representation within
the context of official recognition of First Nations as important contribu-
tors to the electoral process. This, in turn, would address First Nations
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alienation, and ultimately, lead to increased First Nations electoral par-
ticipation and voter turnout in Ontario and Canadian elections. Once
again, assertions that electoral reform with enhanced proportionality
would improve voter turnout are largely irrelevant in the context of First
Nations turnout and nationalism.
Kiera Ladner puts forth similar contentions, arguing for national or
treaty representation through nation-based participation. She asserts
that particularistic representation could work within this context. Ladner’s
following statement is included at length due its relevance:
I would argue, with absolute certainty, that national and/or
treaty representation would increase Aboriginal participa-
tion in electoral politics. Providing for such representation
would enable Aboriginal people to participate in Canadian
electoral politics as nations and to vote as, and for, citizens
of their nations. A system of guaranteed representation could
liberate Aboriginal people from the forces of assimilation, as
individuals would not be forced to participate in the alien
system as “Canadians.” Instead, they could participate in
electoral politics as members of their nations and in a man-
ner that could be designed to incorporate Aboriginal peo-
ples as “nations within.” I would argue that enabling nation-
based participation in electoral politics would…[guarantee]
the inclusion of Aboriginal peoples as candidates and ac-
tors in electoral politics. Moreover, it would enable Aborigi-
nal people to participate (as voters, as candidates and in
debate on issues) as members of nations… .105
It is argued here that the approach suggested herein is certainly
feasible in Ontario, and more generally, in Canada. The primary precon-
dition is political impetus, followed by the substantial resources, time,
and First Nations involvement needed to create the conditions for suc-
cess. It may be that Canadian governments will lack the political will to
undertake such a considerable task, particularly in the face of potential
public objection. Is the Ontario government, and more generally, the
Canadian government, willing to engage in more than symbolic token-
ism by officially recognising the role of First Nations communities as
nations participating fully within Canadian electoral systems? Will the
governments then embark on a path to secure effective First Nations
representation and improve First Nations voter turnout? The implication
of such recognition necessarily entails increased and significant access
to resources for First Nations, thus weighing as an important considera-
tion for any government with the perspicacity to undertake this task.
This is indeed a tall order, but time will tell.
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